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“Google is not a conventional company,” but the founders never intended
it to be one.1 Nicole is two hours deep into her online shopping spree and 
has decided that she must have a pair of new jeans.  After another 20 minutes 
of extensive online browsing, Nicole has narrowed it down to a pair of 
Hudson jeans.  Now she needs to know where she can buy the prized Hudson 
denim.  She types “Hudson jeans” into Google’s search bar.  2,350,000 results 
pop up in .46 seconds. The top three results are Hudson’s, Nordstrom’s, and 
Macy’s official websites—clearly all paid advertisement placements.  On 
the entire right-hand side of the webpage is the “Google Shopping” sponsored 
feature showing pictures of particular styles of Hudson’s with the MRSP 
and website where Nicole can buy the jeans.  This feature cost Google $2.7 
billion.2 
Everyone knows the internet would not be the same without Google. 
Other search engines do exist, but the “world’s biggest and arguably the 
best” serves over 1 billion results every day to 146 countries from its 
California headquarters.3  Google continues to be the most widely used 
Internet service not only in the European Union (“EU”), but the world.  
The search engine has changed the internet to be what it is today and has 
become the staple of almost every internet transaction. Yet this world-
changing company is also just one of many American “tech” companies
that are being punished for their success by the European Union. 
American tech companies, especially large, monopoly-like corporations, 
such as Google, are facing the unjust consequences of their success in the 
EU.  In the past six years, the European Commission (“EC”), the enforcement 
arm of the EU, has started a parade of legal actions against several American 
tech corporations under their antitrust statutes.4  It began in 2000 when the 
EC sued Microsoft for abuse of its dominant position in the market.5  The 
monetary judgment of 732 million was unprecedented: the world had never 
1. ALPHABET, IN., https://abc.xyz/ [https://perma.cc/4SW3-9DD9] (last visited Sept.
23, 2017). 
2. See James Vincent, Google Fined a Record €2.4 Billion by EU for Manipulating 
Search Results, VERGE (June 27, 2017, 5:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/27/ 
15872354/google-eu-fine-antitrust-shopping [https://perma.cc/YY59-8YJM].
 3. Sara Boboltz, 29 Awesome Things You Didn’t Know About Google (But Should), 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:11 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/03/
google-search-facts_n_4697542.html [https://perma.cc/QX73-XHL6].
4. See Vincent, supra note 2.
 5. European Commission vs Microsoft: Chronology of the Case, FREE SOFTWARE 
FOUND. EUR., https://fsfe.org/activities/ms-vs-eu/timeline.en.html [https://perma.cc/4RUE-
YKVA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
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seen such a steep fine for an antitrust violation.6  Since 2000, the EC has 
brought multiple suits against Google under the EU’s antitrust statute for 
abusing its market position by illegally playing favorites with its own 
services and restricting competition on its platform.7 Since just 2015, the
EC has brought three suits against Google.8  The harsh reality is, not a 
single EU-based tech company has emerged to compete against Google 
in the same magnitude or capacity.  Why is the EU punishing a company 
that its constituents continue to use daily if there are no comparable available 
alternatives? This Article will begin to answer this politically and economically
charged question.  It seems, however, that Google is being punished because 
it strategically chooses to use and favor its own services on its own platform—
a regular business practice for any competitive company.
This Article details several case studies, each exemplifying the EU’s pro- 
competition practices versus the American monopoly-like corporations of
Google, Microsoft, and Amazon.  The EU claims that each of these companies 
have abused their dominant position in their respective markets. Many 
companies (including those not listed in this comment) that have faced the 
EU’s antitrust wrath are merely the successful giants of their field, who 
should be enjoying their success, not sitting in fear of success’s implications 
in the global arena.  This comment will conclude with a warning to future 
American corporations on the path to monopoly-like power and status as 
they continue to capture the European market, especially under the current 
Presidency. As Trump’s reputation fluctuates in the European Union, the
antitrust regulatory treatment against Google, Microsoft and Amazon may 
vary in severity.  At least in the European Economic Area (EEA), unless a
company chooses to use “bad” business strategies that contradict self-
preservation ideologies and normal growth projectiles and milestones, it
is not safe from the EU’s parade of enforcement. 
Success is not evil; it is not abusive.  It is capitalism.  So, are these companies 
truly “guilty” for abusing their dominant position or are they just companies 
enjoying their superior positions they have rightly earned? 
6. Microsoft Hit by Record EU Fine, CNN (Mar. 25, 2004, 5:37 AM), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20060413082435/http://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSINESS/03/24/mic
rosoft.eu/ [https://perma.cc/5N8D-PWWX].
7. See Sally Hubbard, Seven Reasons Why Europe’s Antitrust Cases Against Google 












    
 
   
 
      
 
 
   
  
 
    
  
     
 








A. The Rise of Google
Google’s success is a story of brains, determination, and two really cool 
dudes with a dream.  Their creation expanded a world-wide commodity—
the internet—and turned it into monopoly, all from the comfort of a college
dorm room. 
Google’s story began in 1995 at Stanford University by Larry Page and
Sergey Brin.9 Brin was a second-year computer science graduate student.10 
Page was a potential student, and a recent engineering graduate from the
University of Michigan.11  In 1996, after overcoming some differences 
and forming a partnership, the two created Backrub, a search engine that 
used links to organize and determine the importance of webpages on the 
internet.12 Brin and Page realized they had created a querying tool that
would change the World Wide Web and would continue to scale as the web 
scaled. The page ranking system worked by analyzing links; the bigger 
the Web got, the better the engine would become.13  Backrub soon became
Google, a named inspired by “the mathematical expression for the number 
1 followed by 100 zeroes and aptly reflect[ing] Larry and Sergey’s mission 
‘to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible 
and useful.’”14 Continuing to operate out of dorm rooms, Page and Brin built
a server out of deconstructed, used, and borrowed personal computers, 
piggy-backing off Stanford’s server resources.15  Both made the decision
to continue growing Google, withdrawing from their graduate programs.16 
Google, Inc. was born in August 1998 when Sun Microsystems co-founder, 
Andy Bechtolshiem, wrote a check to Google, Inc., a then nonexistent 
corporation, for $100,000.17  They quickly incorporated, raised more money,
and opened the Google, Inc. office in a garage in Menlo Park, California.18 
In late 1999, Google removed its beta (test status) and became the Google 
we use today.19  The unconventional company features the motto “[d]on’t 
9. Our Story, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/our-story/ [https://
perma.cc/T8FM-TR4Z] (last visited Sept. 23, 2017). 
10. John Battelle, The Birth of Google, WIRED (Aug. 1, 2005, 12:00 PM), https://www. 
wired.com/2005/08/battelle/ [https://perma.cc/F4A9-QWYG]. 
11. Id. 
12. Our Story, supra note 9; Mary Bellis, History of Google and How It Was Invented, 
THOUGHTCO (June 27, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/who-invented-google-1991852 
[https://perma.cc/KM9H-ERM4]. 
13. Battelle, supra note 10. 
14. Our Story, supra note 9. 
15. Bellis, supra note 12; Battelle, supra note 10. 
16. See Battelle, supra note 10. 
17. Our Story, supra note 9. 
18. Id.
 19. Bellis, supra note 12. 
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be evil” and lives by “[t]he ten things we know to be true,” both of which
capture the still fun-loving spirit of Google.20 
In 2004, Google moved to Googleplex in Mountainview, California, 
which remains its current headquarters.21  That same year, on August 19,
Google arranged its IPO (initial public offering) on the NASDAQ at $85 per 
share.22  Google made over $1.6 billion at its IPO.23  Alphabet Inc., formed
in 2015, is the American multinational holding company that owns a 
collection of companies, including Google.24 Alphabet allows Google to
be a progressive, environmental, and health-conscientious company able 
to reach goals and seek opportunities beyond Google.25  Another clever 
selection, the name “Alphabet” was chosen as a representation of the 
complexity of language, which becomes the core of Google search.26 
Google has become much more than just Google.com; it now includes 
numerous other business ventures including Google Maps, Android, 
Google Photos, and YouTube which have billions of users across 163 
countries.27  Today, Google employs over 60,000 people in fifty countries 
and has expanded to much more than just a search engine, offering hundreds 
of products and services to the world.28 
B. Google in the European Economic Area 
Few argue against the contention that Google rules the world (and market) 
of search engines.  Surprisingly, Google is substantially more dominant in 
European markets than American, despite being an American-originated 
20. Our Story, supra note 9. 
21. Id. 
22. See Jillian D’Onfro, Here’s How Much You Would Have Made if You’d Invested 
in Google at its IPO, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2016, 6:33 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/google-ipo-how-much-would-you-have-made-2016-8 [https://perma.cc/9UHA-LKTU].
23. See id.
24. Alphabet Inc. Story, SUCCESSSTORY, https://successstory.com/companies/alphabet-inc
[https://perma.cc/LT4C-T93S] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
25. See ALPHABET, INC., supra note 1, for a discussion about the focuses and benefits of
Alphabet Inc. versus Google. 
26. Id.
 27. Anita Balakrishnan, Here’s How Billions of People Use Google Products in 
One Chart, CNBC (May 18, 2017, 4:29 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/18/google-
user-numbers-youtube-android-drive-photos.html [https://perma.cc/5Y8K-URWF]. 
28. Our Story, supra note 9. 
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company.29  In the search engine industry, one may believe that Microsoft 
and Yahoo are holding their ground in the fight for market share against 
Google, but that’s only the case in the United States.30  As of October 2014,
Google owned 92.38% of the European search engine market share with 
its competitors, Yahoo and Bing, trailing behind with a measly 2.67% and 
2.34% respectively.31  In Europe, 73.9% of smartphone users use Google 
Android, with only 15.9% using iOS.32  In global digital advertising revenue, 
Google earns almost four times more revenue than its nearest competitor, 
Facebook.33  Looking at these statistics, with the large market share that
Google occupies, it’s easy for Google to dominate when its users are typing 
word-for-word what they want every second of every day into Google’s 
search box.34 Google doesn’t have to expend time, energy, or resources 
on gathering data because its users are doing it for them, allowing Google 
to adapt to its customer needs with ease.35 Additionally, because the users
keep coming back, this allows the mogul to keep its superior position in 
Europe (and everywhere else) without many of the difficulties and expenses 
its competitors endure. 
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. European Union Antitrust Regulations 
The European Union is governed by two primary treaties: (1) The Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) (also known as the 
Treaty of Rome), and (2) the Maastricht Treaty (formally known as the 
Treaty on European Union) (“TEU”).  These serve as the constitutional basis 
of the Union.36  By establishing the scope of EU’s authority and drafting
principles of law in the areas of law where the EU is permitted to operate, the 
TFEU lays the foundation of EU law.37  The treaty also created the European
Economic Community (“EEC”), a regional committee purposed with economic 
29. Matt Rosoff, Here’s How Dominant Google Is in Europe, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.








36. See Finn Laursen, The Founding Treaties of the European Union and Their Reform, 
OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA POL. (Aug. 2016), https://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-151 [https://perma.cc/K77U-
RWCB]; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 1, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
37. See generally TFEU, supra note 36. 
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integration of the member states through a single market of goods, services, 
labor, and capital.38  The TFEU was signed by Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, and West Germany in Rome on March 25, 1957, 
and came into force on January 1, 1958.39 The Lisbon Treaty, ratified by all
twenty-seven member states of the EU on December 1, 2009, amended both 
the TFEU and the Maastricht Treaty to simplify the EU’s governance 
structure.40 
The EU’s antitrust regulatory scheme is set out in just two articles of 
the TFEU.41 Article 101 bans agreements between two or more independent 
market operators which restrict competition.42  Restriction of competition 
occurs when the purchaser loses the element of freedom over what to do 
with goods and services.43  This highlights the primary goal of competition 
law: to protect and promote certain economic freedoms.44  Both horizontal
(agreements between competitors in the same industry) and vertical 
(agreements between distributor and manufacturer) agreements are 
prohibited.45  The most common example of an Article 101 violation is price-
fixing and market sharing.46 Article 101 immediately voids any agreements, 
undertakings, or concerted practices that: 
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; share 
markets or sources of supply; apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions
with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
38. Id.
 39. EUROSTAT, GLOSSARY: TREATIES OF ROME, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Glossary:Treaties_of_Rome [https://perma.cc/AK8G-9J8A] (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2017). 
40. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon]; 
see also Lisbon Treaty, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Lisbon-Treaty [https:// 
perma.cc/E7ZF-WWAN] (last visited Oct. 8, 2017). 
41. EUROPEAN COMM’N, ANTITRUST OVERVIEW (2014) [hereinafter ANTITRUST 
OVERVIEW]. 
42. Id.
 43. OKEOGHENE ODUDU, THE BOUNDARIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW: THE SCOPE 
OF ARTICLE 81 (2006), https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/97801
99278169.001.0001/acprof-9780199278169-chapter-5 [https://perma.cc/6UPG-EH5T] (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
44. Id.
 45. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW, supra note 41. 
46. Id.
 371
















   
 
   
 
   
 
    
   
  
     
 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.47 
The second major component of EU’s antitrust regulatory scheme is
Article 102.  Article 102 prohibits companies that hold a dominant position
in the marketplace from abusing that position.48  This exceedingly simple
law can be extremely confusing in practice.  Article 102 reads “[a]ny abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member
States.”49  Examples of an Article 102 violation would include charging
unfair prices, limiting production, or applying dissimilar conditions to an 
identical transaction with different parties.50  For example, the European
Commission (EC) fined Lithuanian Railways €28million ($34.6 million) 
for “hindering competition on the rail freight market . . . by removing a 
rail track connecting Lithuania and Latvia” forcing a major customer of 
Lithuanian Railways to close a refinery.51  The EC Commissioner, Margrethe
Vestager, the woman in charge of EU’s competition policy, issued a 
statement that “‘Lithuanian Railways used its control over the national rail 
infrastructure to penalize competitors.  In the rail transport sector . . . it is 
unacceptable and unprecedented that a company dismantles a public rail 
infrastructure to protect itself from competition.’”52 
In addition to the twenty-seven state-managed competition authorities 
of the member states, the EC is the institution tasked with executive powers 
in the areas of competition law and external trade.53  Simply put, the EC 
is the enforcement arm of the EU.  The EC was created and given its power 
by Article 17 of the Maastricht Treaty.54  It is given the authority to apply 
the antitrust rules, investigate potential violations using a variety of tactics 
(such as searching business and non-business premises), and lay fines if a 
violation is found.55  The EC attempts to maintain a policy of prevention 
by providing guidance on how to comply with Article 101 and 102 on its 
47. TFEU, supra note 36, art. 101. 
48. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW, supra note 41. 
49. TFEU, supra note 36, art. 102. 
50. Id. 
51. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release IP/17/3622, The Court of 
Justice, Antitrust: Commission Fines Lithuanian Railways €28 Million for Hindering 
Competition on Rail Freight Market (Oct. 2, 2017). 
52. Id. 
53. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, FACT SHEETS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION (2017); Bruce 
Prager & Howard Rosenblatt, US & EU Competition Law: What Every Counsel Needs to 
Know, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.lw.com/presentations/us-
and-eu-competition-law-2011 [https://perma.cc/DV8B-N54W] (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
54. See Treaty on European Union, May 9, 2008, art. 17 [hereinafter TEU].
55. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW, supra note 41. 
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website.56 Although primarily concerned with prevention, the EC will 
“punish and [sic] deter” violators without hesitating.57  Fines are calculated 
based on a percentage of relevant sales or profit made by the violation and 
consideration of the duration of violation; fines can then be adjusted at the 
Commission’s discretion but cannot exceed more than ten percent of the 
annual turnover of the company.58 
The EC has created distinct policies and procedures for Article 101 and 
Article 102 violations.59  Article 101 cases can originate from a complaint, 
the opening of an own-initiative investigation, whistleblowers, or from 
internal complaints of a company or cartel.60  After the initial complaint
is filed, the Commission conducts an investigation into the accused company.61 
If evidence of anti-competition practices is found during the investigation, 
the Commission issues a statement of objection and prohibits the company
from continuing the violating conduct.62  Companies then have the right 
to defend themselves, and can even request an oral hearing which is heard 
by an independent Hearing Officer.63  After hearing the parties’ arguments,
the Commission can amend part or all of its objections and choose to either 
close the case or draft a decision prohibiting the infringement.64  The draft 
then gets submitted to the Advisory Committee, a committee comprised 
of representatives from Member States, which approves the draft.  Finally, 
the draft is submitted to the College of Commissioners, who adopts the 
decision.65  In the alternative, the Commission can make a commitment 
decision under Article 9 of the Regulation 1/2003.66  Under Article 9, the
Commission does not have to prove infringement and does not impose fines, 
but instead voices its concern about a company’s policies or practices and 
the parties can then come forward with promises to change these practices.67 
56. EUROPEAN COMM’N, FINES FOR BREAKING EU COMPETITION LAW (2011).
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. ANTITRUST OVERVIEW, supra note 41. 
60. EUR. COMM’N, PROCEDURES IN ANTICOMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS (ARTICLE 101





















   
    









        
  
  






If the Commission finds the promises satisfactory, it makes the commitments 
legally binding.68  All parties have the right to appeal.69 
Article 102 cases also originate from either a complaint or the opening 
of an own-initiative investigation.70  The Commission first determines
whether or not the accused is dominant in its relevant market before conducting 
its full investigation into a violation.71  If an Article 102 infringement is 
found, the Commission follows the same procedures as those expressed 
in Article 101.72 
B. American Antitrust Regulations 
The United States’ antitrust laws consist of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
the Federal Trade Commission Act (hereinafter “FTC Act”), and the Clayton 
Antitrust Act.73  Enacted in 1890, the Sherman Act is a comprehensive act
designed to preserve free and unfettered competition by prohibiting 
unreasonable restraints on trade.74  The Sherman Act outlaws “every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in [an effort 
to] restrain [sic] trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations.”75  It also declares, “every person who shall monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or 
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”76  The
Supreme Court held in subsequent cases that any and all restraints on trade 
were not illegal, but only those that were unreasonable.77  What is considered
unreasonable can be explained as: 
[f]or instance, in some sense, an agreement between two individuals to form a
partnership restrains trade, but may not do so unreasonably, and thus may be 
lawful under the antitrust laws. On the other hand, certain acts are considered so
harmful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These include plain 
arrangements among competing individuals or businesses to fix prices, divide
markets, or rig bids. These acts are “per se” violations of the Sherman Act; in other 
words, no defense or justification is allowed.78 
68. Id.
 69. Id.
 70. EUR. COMM’N, PROCEDURES IN ABUSE OF DOMINANCE (ARTICLE 102 TFEU CASES)
(last updated Aug. 16, 2013). 
71. Id.
 72. Id.
 73. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE ANTITRUST LAWS (last visited Mar. 19, 2018). 
74. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C § 1 (1890). 
75. Id.
 76. Id.
 77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect consumers from legitimate 
successful businesses, nor is it to prevent businesses from making honest
profits at the expense of others; rather its purpose is to preserve a competition-
based marketplace and protect innocent consumers from abuse.79  Although
most enforcement actions are civil litigations, violations of the Sherman 
Act can result in criminal prosecutions by the Department of Justice with 
fines up to “$100 million for a corporation, $1 million for an individual, 
and ten years in prison.”80  Criminal actions are usually limited to intentional
and malicious violations like price fixing.81  Moreover, “the maximum fine 
can be increased by twice the amount the conspirators gained from the 
illegal acts or twice the amount lost by victims, if either of those amounts 
are over $100 million.”82 
The Federal Trade Commission Act created the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), an independent agency of the United States government.83 The
Act also bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive 
acts”.84  It allows the FTC to: seek monetary redress and other judiciary relief 
against conspirators for consumer-injurious conduct; proscribe rules and 
regulations that define specific acts that are unfair methods of competition, or 
unfair and deceptive acts, and how to avoid these violations; gather, compile, 
and investigate organizations, businesses, or practices that may violate the 
Act; and make reports and legislative recommendations to Congress and 
the general public.85  Violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act; 
however, the FTC Act outlaws more than anti-competition practices and 
is more comprehensive than the Sherman Act.86  Only the FTC can bring
actions under the FTC Act.87 
Finally, the Clayton Act builds upon the Sherman Act by identifying
specific practices not addressed in the Sherman Act, such as mergers and 
acquisitions or strategic discrimination.88 For example, section 18 of the
Clayton Act prohibits the merger and acquisition of stock companies when 
79. KATALIN J. CESERES, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 291–93 
(2005).
80. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73.
81. Id.
 82. Id.
 83. See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (1914). 
84. Id. 
85. FED.TRADECOMM’N,FEDERALTRADE COMMISSION ACT (last visited Jan. 29, 2019).

















   
 
 
        
        
     
      
        
 
   
    
    
  
“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly.”89  The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936
amended the Clayton Act to also outlaw practices such as using varying 
or discriminatory prices, services, and allowances between different merchants.90 
After another amendment in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvements Act, the Clayton Act required companies planning large mergers 
or acquisitions to notify the government of their plans before closing the 
deal.91  Under the Clayton Act, private party victims are permitted to sue 
for triple damages,92 and a Court can issue an order prohibiting future anti-
competitive practices.93  Additionally, most U.S. states have their own 
antitrust statutes that are modeled after the federal regulations, and enforceable 
via private plaintiffs or the state attorneys general.94 
C. Comparison of European Union and American
Antitrust Regulations 
Despite extensive cooperation and communication between the EU and
American antitrust enforcers, including partnered participation in international
forums and the exchange of “preliminary drafts of guidelines and other 
forms of policy guidance,”95 the European and American antitrust statutes
are notably different. 
With over 100 years of legal development, America’s antitrust laws are 
deep-rooted.96 America’s legislation is embodied in a series of legislations
that have been redrafted and changed over time, while the EU’s is two small 
articles of a single document—its governing treaty created during modern 
times.  The complexity and density of America’s antitrust statutes evidence 
the progression and revolution of our businesses and industries, which is 
largely in response to the ebbs and flows of the American economy.  The 
stature, age, and experience of America’s antitrust regulations and enforcers 
makes it difficult for an organization like the EU to ignore America’s 
experiences when dealing with antitrust.97  For example, it is nearly impossible
for other legal systems to not discuss American antitrust case law when 
89. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1914); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73. 
90. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1914); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73. 
91. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1914); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73. 
92. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1914); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 
73. 
93. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1914); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 73. 
94. Id. 
95. Alden F. Abbott, A Brief Comparison of European and American Antitrust Law,
U. OXFORD CTR. FOR COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 3 (2005).
96. Dr. Wernhard Möschel, US Versus EU Antitrust Law (2007) (unpublished paper) 
(on file with author). 
97. Id.
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addressing competition issues, since America has the most thorough and
expansive case precedent.98  It is interesting to consider why the country 
with the most complex laws finds no issue with Google’s practices.  Perhaps 
the specificity of the American legislation allows Google to know exactly 
what is and is not allowed.  By contrast, the broad, over-reaching language 
of Article 101 and 102 has permitted the EU to strong-arm companies who 
may be unsure as to what is a violation. 
Additionally, antitrust law is a pivotal and influential part of the American
political system. Antitrust statutes have influenced and determined the 
outcome of presidential elections.99  America’s legislation also imposes 
criminal sanctions and punishment, whereas the EU’s does not.  The EU’s 
antitrust legislation is solely a civil process; the accused are not at risk of 
facing significant jail-time or millions of dollars in monetary sanctions as 
an individual.100  The availability of criminal remedies creates public 
awareness.  A potentially liable individual may not be scared of the EU’s 
legislation because he is not personally liable.  Such an individual is shielded 
by his company and can just “stop” the practice to appease the EC.  In America, 
individuals do not enjoy this same luxury of being able to just stop without 
further repercussions.
Another major difference is the role of the state in the respective countries’
antitrust regulatory schemes. In the United States, antitrust proceedings 
are more of a private matter (although they occur in a federal courthouse
which is a public forum), while in the EU, antitrust proceedings exclusively 
involve the state.101  This is largely due to the extensive involvement and
integration of government bodies and organizations in everyday life of the 
EU because of the socialist-political ideologies of many of the member 
states. This is reflected in Article 86(2) of the Lisbon Treaty, which reads 
that under certain circumstances, competition rules do not apply to public 
services and commodities.102  For example, in 2003, German utility giant
(and second largest electric company in the world) E.ON merged with 
Germany’s largest natural gas provider Ruhrgas, despite outcry from 




 101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See Path Cleared for E.On, Ruhrgas Merger, DW (Jan. 31, 2003), https://www. 
dw.com/en/path-cleared-for-eon-ruhrgas-merger/a-768681 [https://perma.cc/NYQ8-PK6M]. 
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but E.ON and Ruhrgas reached out of court settlements promising to pay 
six of the nine plaintiffs over $96 million in total.104  Due to the overriding
public interest of “national safety” the merger received “extraordinary 
clearance by the Secretary of Economic Affairs.”105 In contrast, the United 
States takes pride in its system of checks and balances, giving immense 
freedom and liberty to powerful independent agencies such as the FTC.106 
The FTC is an agency within the executive branch, which is required to 
make biennial reports to Congress—part of the legislative branch.107 Despite 
being accountable to all three branches of the U.S. government,108 the FTC
has complete authority to investigate and punish antitrust violations without 
being required to make daily reports or “check-in” with the U.S. government 
on a regular basis; instead, the FTC behaves more as a silent party that speaks 
only when procedural or administrative issues arise.109  This is not the case 
in the EU, where there is no explicit exception for public services and 
commodities.110  The United States’ commodities and public services are 
not outside the purview of the FTC, or U.S. law in general.111 Also, the U.S.
has delegated generous power to an independent agency which has been 
given a long leash to accommodate the check and balance ideology, hoping 
to ease the pains of managing a country with a population of 323.1 million.  
In comparison, in the EU there is a designated governing body—the 
“enforcement arm” of the EU—in addition to each country’s government 
systems.  Additionally, the EU is composed of 28 countries,112 while the
United States is a single country without an overarching organization created 
to unite and protect it.  Finally, in the U.S., private parties can litigate through 
exclusively private avenues such as a class actions suits if they so choose.113 
104. Id.
 105. See Möschel, supra note 96. 
106.  Id. 
 107. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MATERIALS FOR PARENTS AND TEACHERS: ABOUT THE
FTC (last visited Jan. 31, 2019); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRESS RELEASES: FTC ISSUES BIENNIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE NATIONAL DO NOT CALL REGISTRY (2017) (used as an example
to show how often the FTC reports back to Congress, providing support of the fact that the FTC
is more of a private independent agency separate from the state, instead of a direct arm of
the state like the European Commission). 
108. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SPEECHES: THOUGHTS ON THE FTC’S RELATIONSHIP 
(CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHERWISE) TO THE LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL BRANCHES 
(2009).
109. Id. 
110. See Sherman Antitrust Act § 1.
111. See generally Complaint, United States v. AT&T, No. 1:17-cv-02511 (D.D.C. 
Nov. 20, 2017) (provided as an example to show that the U.S. government can and will sue 
public services and commodity companies). 
112. EUROPEAN UNION, ABOUT THE EU: COUNTRIES (last updated July 12, 2018). 
113. See Prager & Rosenblatt, supra note 53. 
378
WITT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2020 8:59 AM      
 











   
 
   
      
 
      
 
 







[VOL. 21:  365, 2019] Don’t Google It 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
The major similarity between the EU’s and the United States’ statutes
is the policy and ideology behind them. Both the EU and the U.S. want to 
protect the competitive marketplace and consumers from abusive businesses.114 
Capitalism needs competition to survive and thrive.  Over the course of U.S. 
history, companies like Google have morphed into monopolist organizations
that have phased out their competition by successfully capturing the market 
and using efficient business strategies.  Thus is the nature of capitalism.
Additionally, both sets of statutes provide for international reach.  The 
breadth of the language of Article 101 and 102 and the United States’ acts 
allow the countries to effectively investigate and punish international and
domestic companies.115  This is especially important for the U.S. because
an international company needs to successfully penetrate its market to be 
internationally successful;116 although the U.S. only constitutes about five
percent of the world population, a “baby born in the United States will 
consume during its lifetime twenty times as much of the world’s resources 
as an African or Indian baby.”117 
III. DISCUSSION
A. Emergence of Hostility Towards United States’ Powerhouses 
A corporate monopoly is a company with “exclusive ownership through
legal privilege, command of supply, or concerted action,” or one with 
“exclusive possession or control.”118  Google is a “de facto monopoly.”119 
But it is not illegal to dominate a market.  It is not illegal to dominate 
multiple, multi-national markets.  It is not illegal to be a monopoly.  But it is
114. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION: OVERVIEW: MAKING MARKETS WORK
BETTER (last updated Sept. 28, 2015); see also Derek Thompson, America’s Monopoly Problem: 
How Big Business Jammed the Wheels of Innovation, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/10/americas-monopoly-problem/497549/ [https://
perma.cc/X7WT-QM98] (explaining that the Sherman Act was passed to protect the competitive 
marketplace even though it was not successful for several years). 
115. See Prager & Rosenblatt , supra note 53, at 4–15; see also Sherman Antitrust Act § 1.




118. Monopoly, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM DICTIONARY (2019).
119. See Jim Edwards, Look at the Evidence: Google’s Troubles in Europe are Entirely 
of Its Own Making, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider. 
com/eu-google-antitrust-monopoly-europe-case-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/BF2L-C8VL].  
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illegal to abuse that position at the cost of consumers or use anti-competition
behavior towards other companies.120  In the eyes of the European Union, 
this is where U.S. tech powerhouse companies are in the wrong. 
The EC has found Microsoft, Intel, and Google “guilty” of abusing their 
dominant positions in the European market.121  The EC’s valiant antitrust
efforts are advertised as an effort to prevent harm and protect consumers, 
but this propaganda is nothing more than a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  It 
appears that the concern is actually more focused on the effect the violating 
practices have on other companies, not end-users and general consumers. 
In 2000, the EC took its first historic stand against United States-based
“monopolies” in Microsoft Corporation v. Commission.  The Commission 
found that Microsoft abused its dominant position in the market.122  The
investigation into Microsoft was triggered after Sun Microsystems filed a 
complaint claiming “Microsoft had failed to provide technical information 
needed for servers running Sun’s Solaris operating system to fully inter-
operate with PCs running Windows.”123 The Commission found that
Microsoft’s refusal “resulted in the foreclosure of competitors from the 
server OS market.”124  The Commission ordered Microsoft to grant licenses
on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to parties interested in developing 
and distributing work group server operating system products.125 
The second major issue was the “tying” of Windows Media Player and 
Windows PC operating system.126  The Commission found that such “tying,”
“prevented the suppliers of other media players from gaining comparable 
120. See Prager & Rosenblatt, supra note 53, at 2–4. 
121. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Computing Tech. Industry Ass’n, Inc., 2017
E.C.R. II-3619, 3629; Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No. 90/17, 
The Court of Justice Sets Aside the Judgment of the General Court Which Had Upheld the 
Fine of €1.06 Billion Imposed on Intel by the Commission for Abuse of a Dominant Position 
(Sept. 6, 2017) (the judgment was later set aside in 2014 when the General Court dismissed 
Intel’s action); European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission 
Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal 
Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017). 
122. See Robin van der Hout, Microsoft Corporation v. Commission of the European 
Communities, LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM: INT’L L. (May 22, 2008), https://www.lexis 
nexis.com/LegalNewsRoom/international-law/b/commentry/posts/microsoft-corporation-
v.-commission-of-the-european-communities [https://perma.cc/F5U4-N5LJ]. 
123. See Ten Years of Legal Wrangling Between Microsoft and EU: The Milestones 
Since the EU Began Investigating Microsoft’s Business Practices in 1988, GUARDIAN (Feb.  
27, 2008, 8:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/27/microsoft.europe1 
[https://perma.cc/VQZ9-B8FS].
124. See van der Hout, supra note 122. 
125. Katharine Stephens, Microsoft v. Commission of European Communities, BIRD 
& BIRD (Mar. 3, 2005), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2005/microsoft-v-
commission-of-european-communities [https://perma.cc/GGT7-2KUK].
126.  van der Hout, supra note 122. 
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access to consumers’ PCs.”127 Consequently, Microsoft was required to offer
a version of Windows without Windows Media Player and was fined €497.2 
million.128 
In 2009, the Commission imposed a €1.06 billion ($1.3 billion) fine on 
Intel.129  Intel, the United States-based microchip manufacturer, was found
guilty of abusing its dominant position in the market of x86 central processing 
units (“CPUs”).130  The Commission determined that Intel abused its dominant
position in the market by implementing a strategy that foreclosed its competitor, 
Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD), from access to the market.131  Intel
offered rebates to four main computer manufacturers (Dell, Lenovo, PC, 
and NEC), on the condition they buy most, if not all, of their CPUs from 
Intel.132  Additionally, Intel offered payments to Media-Saturn-Holding and
other OEM’s (aftermarket retailers who bundle services around Intel’s 
products) on the condition that they exclusively sell computers containing 
Intel’s CPU’s, thus delaying, restricting, and canceling the ability of non-
Intel CPU producers to be competitive at these retailers.133  At the time, 
Intel held approximately 70% of the market share.134 
On one hand, it appears that Intel used incentivizing business strategies,
not abusive ones.  On the other hand, the Commission found that it was 
extremely difficult for competitors to enter the market and expand because 
of the steep investment necessary by non-Intel CPU producers for research 
and development, intellectual property, and production facilities, which in 
the end would not produce enough income to compete with Intel’s discount
and incentive practices to support and sustain a profitable business.135 
Intel appealed the Commission’s decision hoping to annul it or receive a 
substantial fine reduction, but the General Court upheld the decision in
2014.136  On September 6, 2017, on appeal to the highest court of the European 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Case COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel, Comm’n Decision, ¶ 1803 (May 13, 2009) (summary
at 2009 O.J. (C 227) 13), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_
decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R8B-HGMZ]. 
130. Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release IP/90/17, The Court of Justice
Sets Aside the Judgment of the General Court Which Had Upheld the Fine of €1.06 Billion 
Imposed on Intel by the Commission for Abuse of a Dominant Position (Sept. 6, 2017). 
131. Id.
 132. Id. 
133. Id.
 134. Id.
 135. See id.
 136. Id.
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Union, the court remanded the case back to the lower court to take a second 
look at Intel’s case to analyze whether the rebates at issue were capable 
of restricting competition in light of the arguments put forward by Intel.137 
There are currently no updates on the status of the remand as of the time 
of writing.
In European Commission v. Google, the EC issued a €2.4 billion fine 
against Google for violations of EU antitrust laws.138  The EC gave Google 
ninety days to terminate its preferential conduct of displaying its own shopping 
comparison services above competitors and ordered Google to give equal 
treatment to rival comparison shopping services on its platform, or face 
penalty payments of up to five percent of the average daily worldwide 
turnover of Alphabet.139  In the decision, the EC confirmed that Google
has held the dominant position in general internet search markets in Europe 
since 2008 (except the Czech Republic where it has held its position since 
2011).140  The main issue in this case were desktop searches, which as opposed 
to mobile platforms, provide significantly more digital “real estate” for 
Google to list its competitors’ services while still displaying its own.141 
Mobile devices by default provide even less “real estate” for search
results, so it is fair that Google would prioritize its own services on mobile 
platforms.142  The contention was that when a user in the EEA conducted
a Google search on its laptop, home computer, or desktop, the top portion 
of the screen was dedicated to the “Google Shopping” search results.143 
Competitor shopping comparison sites were generally listed further down 
in the search results.144  According to the EC’s research, the top ten results
on the first page receive 95% of all clicks for generic search results, which 
means comparison sites would not receive similar attention.145 
In a press release, Margrethe Vestager, Commissioner of the EC, stated: 
“What Google has done is illegal under EU’s antitrust rules. It denied other
137. Id.; James Kanter & Amie Tsang, Intel’s $1.3 Billion Fine in Europe Requires 
Review, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/
business/intel-eu-antitrust-fine.html [https://perma.cc/UM5U-CYXR].
138. Case AT.39740—Google Search (Shopping), Comm’n Decision, ¶ 754 (June 27,
2017) (summary at 2018 O.J. (C 9) 11), https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/ 
dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/KRB3-2RV3]; European Commission 
Press Release IP/17/1784, supra note 121. 
139.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, supra note 121. 
140. Id.
141. Gerrit De Vynck, These Search Results Show Why Europe Is Mad at Google, 
BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
06-27/these-google-search-results-show-why-europe-is-mad [https://perma.cc/WTV3-R8KG].
142. Id.
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companies the chance to compete on the merits and to innovate. And most 
importantly, it denied European consumers a genuine choice of services 
and the full benefits of innovation.”146  The EC found Google was illegally
using favoritism practices on the Google Shopping feature by demoting 
rivals and unfairly promoting its own services.147 The EC gathered over 5.2
terabytes of actual search results from Google (about 1.7 billion search 
queries) during its investigation.148  Surprisingly, most of the complaints
did not come from European consumers, but rather disgruntled American 
technology companies and their lobbyists whose international businesses 
have been injured by Google’s practices.149  Google may also be subject
to civil actions for damages by any business or individual that has been 
personally injured by its anti-competitive behavior.150 
The EC still has two open cases against Google for its AdSense and
Android services.151 In the case against Google’s AdSense, the Commission 
is concerned that Google has reduced consumer choice by preventing third- 
party websites from sourcing search ads from Google’s competitors.152  In
the current investigation against Google’s Android operating system, “the 
Commission is concerned that Google has stifled choice and innovation 
in a range of mobile apps and services by pursuing an overall strategy on 
mobile devices to protect and expand its dominant position in general 
internet search.”153 
Business competition and consumer choice are not the only factors that 
drive antitrust regulation; the political and economic climate of international
bodies and governments that impact European regulation on American
tech businesses are additional factors that drive the field forward. The
subsequent section will discuss America’s political climate under the 
Trump presidency and how the fluctuations of this climate may correlate
to the European Union’s regulatory scheme and treatment of existing and 
emerging American tech giants. 
146.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, supra note 121. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Jim Edwards, Look at the Evidence: Google’s Troubles in Europe Are Entirely 
of its Own Making, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/eu-google-antitrust-monopoly-europe-case-2017-6 [https://perma.cc/WY28-P884]. 
150.  European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, supra note 121. 


















   
    
 









   
   
  
B. Trump’s Reputation in the European Union
Disregarding personal political views, it is incontestable that there are
drastically mixed opinions on President Donald Trump, nationally and
internationally.  Although Trump won the electoral vote, more Americans 
voted for Hillary Clinton in the popular vote than any other losing presidential 
candidate in the history of the U.S.154  Clinton outpaced Trump by almost 
2.9 million votes, and it shows.155  According to surveys, 295 days into Trump’s 
presidency 56.1% of the American people disapprove of the President.156 
Internationally, many have described Trump as “dangerous, arrogant, 
and intolerant.”157  The Pew Research Center’s annual survey on global
attitudes towards the U.S. and its president found that of 37 countries, 
22% had confidence that Trump would do the right thing when it comes 
to international affairs, and 74% had no confidence in him.158  Shockingly,
27% of those surveyed were confident that even Vladimir Putin would do 
the right thing when it comes to international affairs.159  Overall, all of
Trump’s major policy proposals featured in the survey (such as the withdrawal 
from the Iran nuclear deal, ending support of major trade agreements, and 
implementing the travel ban, among others) faced strong opposition.160 In 
comparison, former President Barack Obama was favorably viewed by 
64% of survey respondents at the end of his second term.161 
Trump’s announcement of the U.S.’s withdrawal from the 2015 Paris 
Climate Agreement triggered global condemnation.162 The European Union
even rejected the President’s proposition to renegotiate, choosing instead 
to bypass Washington and work directly with U.S. states, major corporations, 
and climate change groups.163 Donald Tusk, President of the European
154. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN
(Dec. 22, 2016, 5:34 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary- 
clinton-popular-vote-final-count/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q8CV-RVSQ].
155. Id.
 156. How (Un)popular is Donald Trump?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, https://projects.fivethirty 
eight.com/trump-approval-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/D357-M8BS]. 
157. Jason Le Miere, Trump’s Approval Rating Is Even Lower Globally, and He’s




 159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id.
162. Daniel Boffey, Kate Connolly & Anushka Asthana, EU to Bypass Trump 
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Council, dubbed Trump’s move a “big mistake,” and Germany, Italy, and
France issued a joint declaration in opposition.164  President Trump’s bad
reputation has seemingly seeped into the international community’s perspective 
of the U.S. as a whole, with only 49% having a favorable opinion of the 
U.S. (down from 64% under Obama).165  According to this survey, the sole
glimmer of hope for the President was that 55% of those polled thought he 
was a strong leader.166 
President Trump’s decisions while in office have only solidified his
reputation in Europe as a “danger to the planet,” which has inadvertently 
united the continent.167  In response to Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris
Climate Agreement, Europe’s leaders have vowed to “stick to their guns 
on Paris and work even harder to save the planet” without America.168  In 
Trump’s speech to NATO in May 2017, he berated U.S. allies for not 
spending enough on defense and suggested they owe “massive amounts” 
in back payments to the U.S., confirming the fears of European leadership 
that Trump “doesn’t just play the Ugly American on TV.”169  To add fuel
to the fire, Trump later critiqued Germany for selling too many cars in the 
U.S. (many of which are made in America), depicting his clear lack of 
understanding of transatlantic trade and commerce.170 These actions have
translated into a belief that Trump views his “western” allies as a financial 
relationship, rather than as a community of shared ideologies and values, 
disrespecting a century-long friendship.171  Instead of America and the EU 
sharing a common enemy, Trump has made America the enemy. 
Following Brexit in June 2016, Europe was in a full-blown funk.172 But 
today, economic stagnation has ended, and Europe is a changed continent 
164. Id.
165.  Le Miere, supra note 157. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Matthew Karnitschnig, Trump Makes Europe (Feel) Great Again, POLITICO 
(June 1, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-makes-europe-feel-great-
again/ [https://perma.cc/7X29-ENXC].
168. Id. 
169. Matthew Karnitschnig, Trump Confirms Europe’s Worst Fears, POLITICO (May




 172. Matthew Kaminski, Trump and Europe, Trading Places, POLITICO (May 25, 
2017, 2:30 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-and-europe-trading-places-
political-instability-brussels-washington/ [https://perma.cc/3XPW-TSFS].
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fueled with confidence.173  This changed mentality has birthed a new identity,
a common sense of purpose for Europeans that is equipped to combat 
President Trump’s arrogance, intolerance, and futile political schemes.174 
C. How Will American Monopolies or Monopoly-Like Companies be 
Treated Under Trump’s Presidency? 
Economics played a huge role in the outcome of the United States’ 2016
Presidential Election.175  The fear of a 2008 Financial Crisis repeat, decline
in competition, and America’s reliance on foreign states have fueled complaints 
and cries from both Republicans and Democrats.176  President Trump ran
a campaign boasting about promoting American businesses, reviving the 
American economy, and focusing on internal affairs to “Make America 
Great Again.”177  After being elected, he continued to position himself as
pro-business/pro-monopoly by selecting Jay Clayton, a Wall Street mergers 
and acquisition attorney who specializes in corporate consolidation, as the 
chairman of the SEC.178  Additionally, many business owners are optimistic
that their businesses will do much better under the Trump administration’s 
pro-business, anti-regulatory, and pro-tax reform position, since many 
small businesses believe that the current regulatory scheme is the “biggest 
hindrance to their business.”179 This could be considered evidence of Trump’s
inadvertent support of big business and the concentration of businesses 
that are allowed to harm competition, as long as they benefit the American 
economy and keep American jobs on American soil.  Some have even 
characterized his policies as “pro-business, [but] not pro-market.”180  Although
commonly confused as one in the same, pro-business and pro-market are 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. See generally Justin Talbot-Zorn, Will Donald Trump Be the Most Pro-Monopoly
President in History?, NATION (Jan. 14, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/will-
donald-trump-be-the-most-pro-monopoly-president-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/FR8N-K3MW]. 
176. Id. 
177. Bloomberg, Trump’s Pro-Business Image Tarnished as CEOs Abandon Him, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/08/19/donald-trumps-pro-business-
image-tarnished-ceos-abandon/ [https://perma.cc/7GGG-6K4Q]; About, DONALD J. TRUMP,
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/MP4N-3MN4]. 
178. Talbot-Zorn, supra note 175. 
179. Andrew Soergel, CEOs Bullish on Trump’s Pro-Business Agenda, U.S. NEWS 
(Mar. 14, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-03-14/ceos-bullish-
on-trumps-pro-business-agenda [https://perma.cc/F44Z-VSAG].
180. Luigi Zingales,
PRO-MARKET (Jan. 12, 2017), 
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very different ideologies.181 Pro-business advocates believe the government
should directly assist and provide tax benefits to certain businesses and 
industries, and that the government should limit competition to protect 
domestic industries and American workers—essentially, businesses are 
competing for government favoritism.182  In contrast, pro-market advocates
believe the government should ensure a level playing field for competition, 
including equal tax rates for all, and the government should expand 
competition, leading to lower prices and better quality goods.183  Trump’s
pro-business tendencies are further evidenced by his tax bill: The Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act.184  It permanently cuts the corporate tax rate from 35 to 21
percent in 2018 (making it the lowest tax rate since 1939) and temporarily 
reduces individual income tax rates, doubles the standard deduction, and 
eliminates personal exemptions until 2025.185  The Act also raises the standard 
deduction to 20% for pass-through businesses which includes partnerships, 
sole proprietorships, limited liability companies, S corporations, real estate 
companies, hedge funds, and private equity funds.186  Additionally, it allows
businesses to deduct the cost of depreciable assets in one year instead of 
amortizing them over a span of the asset’s useful life, resulting in higher 
net income in more years (except for the year the company opts to depreciate 
the asset).187  Despite these drastic tax cuts that benefit businesses overall, 
the tax bill does provide some pro-market provisions that will generate 
significant revenues for the nation as whole and hurt highly-indebted 
corporations.188 
So, what do President Trump’s pro-business policies mean for American
monopoly-like corporations in the EEA? The EC’s decision to fine Google 
181. “Pro-Business” or “Pro-Market”? And What’s the Difference?, CHARLES KOCH 
INST. (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.charleskochinstitute.org/blog/pro-business-pro-market-
whats-difference/ [https://perma.cc/DA89-MAKM].
182. Id.
 183. Id. 
184. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017);
H.R. REP. NO. 115-409 (2017).





188. This list is not exhaustive, but some examples include: limiting the ability of
corporations to deduct interest expense, eliminating the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) 
which allows corporations to deduct research expenses, and developing spending or 
investments in low-income communities. See id. 
 387




      
    
 


















$2.7 billion led to accusations against the EU of protectionism and anti-
American bias.189  The EU has repeatedly defended its astronomical fines
against Google, Intel, and Microsoft by stating that the same guidelines would 
apply to a company that originated from a member state.190 However, it is
consistently American corporations that experience the necessary success 
and growth that they accumulate massive percentages of market share in 
the EEA (and the rest of the world).  Although some EU-based companies 
have been fined in the past (such as Daimler, the manufacturer of Mercedes 
Benz and other automobiles), concerns have arisen that the EU’s antitrust 
enforcement adversely affects U.S. companies, since American tech corporations
are more likely to be dominant in the EEA based on their success.191 
A major influencing factor of the EU’s antitrust enforcement parade 
could be culture. The European view of the marketplace is wary of large 
corporations holding “market power.”192 Thus, the EC might be more likely
than America to take affirmative action to protect consumers from anti-
competition practices.193  This is probably because the EU is made up of 
smaller economies, where consumers would suffer greater harm in a highly- 
concentrated economy, because consumers would be unable to successfully 
put pressure on businesses regarding issues of price, supply/demand, 
or changes in consumer trends. 
The bias may also result from the fear of a company holding economic 
and political dominance.  For example, if a company in Germany is the 
largest manufacturer in the EU and manufactures 95% of a particular good
in the region, then all other member states would be relying on one company
for certain categories of goods.  That company could greatly influence 
political, social, and economic policies due to its lobbying power as a result 
of its control of the market.  The EU probably aims to hold enough control 
through regulation to prevent a country (or company) from gaining enough
economic power and stability to do what England did in Brexit (that is, break 
away from or dominate the Union). 
Part of the problem is that Europe is generally not the creator or the 
originator of these monopoly-like, global companies.  Europe’s economy
has been shrinking over the last century, slowly losing its footing in many
189. Ivana Kottasová, European Union: We’re Not Biased Against American Companies, 
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industries to other nations.194  The U.S. and China have been at the forefront
of technology and internet innovation for years, and neither of these areas 
have ever been the European Union’s strong suit.195  BP, HSBC, Vodafone, 
Nestle, and Shell are among the EU’s largest companies and they are largely 
concentrated in the oil and gas industry.196  So, is the EU just bitter it isn’t
innovating on the same scale as the U.S. and is therefore retaliating against 
American companies?  Maybe—but this seems rather petty for the respectable 
international political and economic Union.  It is also possible its antitrust 
regulatory scheme appears so strict and prejudicial because it does not 
have the understanding and appreciation for these types of companies, due 
to the lack of firsthand experience fostering and protecting a monopoly-
like company.  Finally, and most logically, it’s possible that its protectionist
ideologies, which stem from its socialist values, are influencing its regulatory 
scheme. The reality could also be a combination of these possibilities: the 
EU is ferociously protecting its own smaller-scale economy, in addition 
to targeting American tech corporations because they are the easy “scapegoat”
in this scenario. 
As Trump’s pro-business policies continue to be implemented and he 
continues to reiterate his pro-America rhetoric, the EU may increase its
hostility towards American monopoly-like corporations in an effort to 
protect its economy, businesses, and consumers.  Thus, although the EU
claims it does not have an outright bias against American countries, its 
distaste for America’s leading man and its inclination towards self-preservation 
will continue to blow back on American companies.
D. Potential Repercussions Against Amazon, the Rising Monopoly
Amazon, the prominent online retailer and cloud service provider, is quickly 
becoming one of the world’s corporate powerhouses.197  The online retailer
based out of Seattle, Washington was launched in 1995 by Jeff Bezos, the 
194. Adam Taylor & Sarah Rappaport, The 20 Biggest Companies in Europe, THE 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 22, 2011, 10:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/europe-
biggest-companies-company-2011-7 [https://perma.cc/4K3Y-3SHD].
195.  See id.
 196. Id. 
197. Shana Lebowitz, Amazon’s Success Is Unparalleled – and ‘Type 2 Decisions’ Are 
a Major Reason Why, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
why-amazon-is-so-successful-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/3A9U-B95A].
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current CEO, as a website that only sold books.198  Jeff originally wanted
to name the site “Cadabra” but concerns were raised that it was too close 
to “Cadaver;” he then considered “Relentless,”199 but eventually settled on 
“Amazon,” attributed to the world’s largest river.200  Mr. Bezos’s motto,
“Get Big Fast,” a slogan that was printed on employee T-shirts, was rooted 
in Mr. Bezos’s unwavering faith in the possibilities of the internet.201 In 
just the first year of operation, Amazon had 180,000 customer accounts.202 
By year two, it had 1,000,000.203  “Get Big Fast” was exactly what Amazon
did.  The company diversified its inventory over the years to include any 
consumer product imaginable and has since evolved into the technology 
industry, offering cloud services and software.  The company went public 
in 1997, raising $54 million through its initial public offering on the 
NASDAQ.204 
Amazon’s primary business strategy has always been simplification for 
the consumer—a strategy that was largely criticized at the beginning by 
business analysts and financial journalists, but a strategy that has repeatedly 
proven effective.205  By the end of 2015, Amazon had 304 million active 
customer accounts worldwide.206  A 2017 study revealed that a whopping 84%
of U.S. consumers made a purchase on Amazon in the previous year, 55% 
of which were Prime subscribers.207 Let that soak in—almost half of all U.S.
consumers are paying $100 per year for Amazon’s services.  According to an 
Amazon user study, two in five Prime members and more than a quarter of 
198. Avery Hartmans, 15 Fascinating Facts You Probably Didn’t Know About 
Amazon, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2018, 9:22 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-
bezos-amazon-history-facts-2017-4/#amazon-wasnt-the-companys-original-name-1 [https://
perma.cc/V5L4-TY8U]. 
199. Id. EDS: Fun fact: go to relentless.com and see where it leads you.
200. Id.




204. Jeff Sommer, The Mind-Boggling Ascent of Amazon and Jeff Bezos, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/your-money/amazon-jeff-bezos.html
[https://perma.cc/L7GD-XC5F]; Amazon Global Fulfillment Center Network, MWPVL INT’L,
https://www.mwpvl.com/html/amazon_com.html [https://perma.cc/V48J-MR3Y].
205. See Jeff Bezos on Leading for the Long-Term at Amazon, HARVARD BUS. R.,
https://hbr.org/2013/01/jeff-bezos-on-leading-for-the [https://perma.cc/9C5M-G47W] (last
visited Mar. 7, 2019); see also Leadership Principles, AMAZON: JOBS, https://www.amazon.
jobs/en/principles [https://perma.cc/V9F5-RG3D] (last visited Mar. 7, 2019). 
206. Annual Number of Worldwide Active Amazon Customer Accounts from 1997 to 
2015 (in Millions), STATISTA (January 2016), https://www.statista.com/statistics/237810/ 
number-of-active-amazon-customer-accounts-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/8BEA-BHH7].
207. Tom Popomaronis,
Get Bigger, FORBES 
 The Inexorable Rise of Amazon: Nine Reasons Why It’ll Only 
(Aug. 4, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tompopomaronis/ 
2017/08/04/jeff-bezos-amazon/#7203a9885c16 [https://perma.cc/XV2H-MWWC]. 
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non-Prime members check Amazon before making an online purchase.208 
Finally, on Prime Day 2016, Amazon’s site-wide sale that launched in 2015, 
nearly fifty million people visited the site (only ten million fewer than the 
number who visited Amazon on Cyber Monday).209  These numbers speak
for themselves: by any measure, Amazon is widely successful. 
Amazon is also the most visited online retailer in Europe.210  In December 
2012, 26.4 million Europeans visited the site.211  Amazon was also ranked 
number one in the Internet Retailer 2014 Europe 500.212  Retailers from
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom selling 
on Amazon generated total sales of $3.08 billion in one year.213  Amazon 
has also continued to build up its fulfillment and distribution network in 
Europe, expanding from twenty-eight distribution centers in 2015 to over 
100 distribution centers throughout Europe in 2017.214 
Amazon offers consumers the ultimate digital experience: combining 
ease of use and browsing experience, convenience,  and price comparison
with a speedy website, shipping speed, and customer service.215  The notoriety 
and success of the online mogul has forced brick and mortar retailers and 
brands to sell on Amazon to survive, or at least to remain competitive.216 
What’s truly amazing is that Amazon started as an online bookstore and has 
since become a “technology innovation hub expanding far beyond retail 
sales” and changing the way the world views e-commerce.217  Amazon
is arguably already a de facto monopoly, but nevertheless an innovative 
and aspirational monopoly. 
208. Id. 
209. Jeff Dunn, Prime Day Brings Nearly as Many Eyes to Amazon as Cyber Monday, 
BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2017, 6:05 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-prime-
day-how-much-traffic-chart-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/59YE-82WS].
210. Katie Evans, Amazon Is the Most Visited Online Retailer in Europe, DIGITAL 
COM. 360 (Mar. 25, 2013), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2013/03/25/amazon-
most-visited-online-retailer-europe/ [https://perma.cc/8Z85-Y6MX].
211. Id.
 212. Mark Brohan, Amazon Builds Up Its European Marketplace, DIGITAL COM. 360 
(Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2015/04/30/amazon-builds-its-
european-marketplace/ [https://perma.cc/GWF9-RP8A]. 
213. Id.
 214. Id.; Amazon Global Fulfillment Center Network, supra note 204. 



































The EC already has its eyes on Amazon.  In June 2015, the EC launched 
an investigation into Amazon for its “most-favored-nation” clauses,218 which 
required publishers to alert Amazon about terms offered by its competitors.219 
The EC was concerned that Amazon was using its dominant position to
ensure its terms were at least as favorable as its competitors, leading to
less choice, less innovation, and higher prices for consumers, since Amazon 
would always have an informational advantage.220  The clauses required 
publishers to notify Amazon of more favorable prices and differentiators 
given to competitors, such as business or distribution models and promotions.221 
In May 2017, after almost two years of investigation, the EC and Amazon 
came to a legally binding agreement.222  Amazon offered to change its contracts
to comply with the EC’s concerns by stripping the clauses at issue or by
allowing publishers to terminate their e-book contracts that contain the 
clause for a period of five years.223 
Amazon was fortunate to avoid fines, but it only did so because it 
compromised, not because the EC found that Amazon had done no wrong.224 
Margrethe Vestager, the European Commissioner for Competition, stated
the compromise “will open the way for publishers and competitors to develop 
innovative services for e-books, increasing choice and competition to the 
benefit of European consumers.”225  Amazon rightfully celebrated the agreement 
as well.226  There is no doubt that the EC will remain vigilant to ensure Amazon’s
218. The term “most-favored-nation” (“MFN”) is used in Amazon’s contracts and
legal literature surrounding Amazon as a different term of art from how it is used in the 
trade sense of the word.  In the contracts, “MFN” means that the seller cannot sell on another 
site cheaper than they sell on Amazon.  See David Stretfield, The Week in Tech: Amazon’s 
Burning Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/04/
technology/amazon-problems.html [https://perma.cc/J9GH-BSZC]; see also Jonathan B.
Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE 
L.J. 2176, 2177 (2018) (discussing the MFN clauses contained in various tech companies’
contracts and detailing the effects and purpose of such clauses).  Amazon has since repealed the 
use of these clauses.  See Makena Kelly, Amazon Silently Ends Controversial Pricing Agreements 
with Sellers, THE VERGE (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/11/18260700/ 
amazon-anti-competitive-pricing-agreements-3rd-party-sellers-end [https://perma.cc/CKN4-
HRM7].
219. Colin Dwyer, EU Drops Its Antitrust Probe Over Amazon E-Book Contracts, NPR 
(May 4, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/04/526893839/
eu-drops-its-antitrust-probe-over-amazon-e-book-contracts [https://perma.cc/X2DH-5YGS].
220. Id.; European Commission Press Release IP/17/1223, Antitrust: Commission Accepts 
Commitments from Amazon on E-Books (May 4, 2017). 
221. Dwyer, supra note 219. 
222.  Id. 
223. Id.; European Commission Press Release IP/17/1223, supra note 220. 
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compliance with its agreement.227  If Amazon breaches, the Commission 
could impose fines of up to 10% of Amazon’s annual turnover without having
to find another antitrust violation.228  Simply choosing not to comply could
result in an approximately $13 billion dollar fine for Amazon. 
In this case, the EC merely launched a probe into Amazon and did not
initiate a formal case against them. Amazon may not be as lucky in the 
future.  If Amazon violates Article 102, they could be subject to hefty fines.
The company is more than capable of paying such a fine (albeit with great 
reluctance), but it is clear the EC has gotten more confident in handing 
out steep fines as evidenced by the progressive increase of each fine in the
cases discussed above. This investigation should be taken as a warning
from the EC and a premonition for what is to come as Amazon continues 
on its pathway to further success and expansion. 
For example, Amazon’s recent $13.7 billion acquisition of Whole Foods
opens the door for major expansion of Amazon’s Fresh feature by giving the 
company access to consumer’s grocery buying habits, patterns, and preferences 
and an admired, private label brand.229  Amazon should be wary that as they
continue to expand and employ similar business practices such as the “most- 
favorable-nation” clauses, they are creating a one-stop, comprehensive 
marketplace. This could deter consumers from using traditional brick and 
mortar retailers, potentially putting Amazon at risk of being targeted by 
the EU. Say, hypothetically, Amazon acquired a pharmaceutical company 
and created an option for prescriptions to be refilled online and delivered 
straight to your home; brick and mortar stores such as Rite Aid, CVS, and 
grocery stores may begin to lose substantial parts of their market share,
income, and customer loyalty.  According to a survey, consumers are more
likely to shop for products online instead of going in store, with brick and 
mortar stores winning in only one of six categories—household essentials.230 
There is no question that most consumers will choose convenience, but what’s 
227. Id.





 Amazon’s Acquisition of Whole Foods Is About Two Things: Data and 
(Aug. 2, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/2017/
08/02/amazons-acquisition-of-whole-foods-is-about-two-things-data-and-product/#1df2a2 
a80843 [https://perma.cc/VRE6-K4D6]. 
230. Sandy Skrovan, Why Consumers Prefer to Shop for Nearly All Products Online, 
RETAIL DIVE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.retaildive.com/news/why-consumers-prefer-
to-shop-for-nearly-all-products-online/437886/ [https://perma.cc/4Q9X-9B25]. 
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even more influential is the ability to compare prices.231  It is important to
note that this assertion may vary with factors such as age and gender.  But, 
according to some research, 79% of U.S. adults are already shopping online 
versus in-store.232 
The fact of the matter is that Amazon isn’t getting less popular and so 
it is not becoming less of a target anytime soon.  As it continues to monopolize,
the more aggressive its practices and strategies will become, naturally
minimizing competition in its field.  It may already be too late for new 
competition in the online retailer industry because the costs of entering
the market might be too high for a new business to incur233 or existing
businesses are not willing to take the risk to compete against the existing 
mogul, similar to the EU’s concerns in the Intel case.  If Amazon is already 
under a microscope, it is possible that the EU will launch several more 
investigations against the retailer.  Amazon will have to choose whether it 
wants to continue to comply or face the fines.  Regardless, the effect of its 
business decisions and strategies in the EU should be a concern for Amazon. 
Amazon could choose to take the financial and market share hit by not 
entering the European market with as much force and change its current
strategies to avoid dispute with the EC.  Because it is an online retailer, it 
can easily modify its site such that it only implements certain strategies 
based on the consumer’s access location.  However, after acknowledging 
that Europe is the world’s second largest economy,234 it is unlikely Amazon 
will choose this option unless the cost-benefit analysis weighs in favor of 
losing profits versus paying the fines.  It ultimately comes down to two 
231. Sarah Perez, 79 Percent of Americans Now Shop Online, but It’s Cost More Than 




233. Because of how established Amazon is, holding 38% market share in the e-commerce
industry, the start-up costs for a new company (research, development, marketing, staff 
and personnel) compared to the margins and small percentage of successfully capturing 
the market, strongly discourages companies from taking the risk of entering the e-commerce 
market. See Rani Molla, Amazon Could Be Responsible for Nearly Half of U.S. E-Commerce 
Sales in 2017, RECODE (Oct. 24, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/10/24/165
34100/amazon-market-share-ebay-walmart-apple-ecommerce-sales-2017 [https://perma.cc/ 
W3ZG-JJSN].
234. The EU’s economy based upon gross domestic product (GDP) was ahead of the 
United States in 2015 and generated $19.2 trillion of the world’s economic output of $119.4 
trillion in 2016. Kimberly Amadeo, World’s Largest Economies: 2017 Results, How It’s 
Measured, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044 [https:// 
perma.cc/Z26G-DF8B]; Abby Budiman & Dorothy Manevich, Few See EU as World’s Top 
Economic Power Despite Its Relative Might, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/few-see-eu-as-worlds-top-economic-power-despite-
its-relative-might/ [https://perma.cc/5EC5-DFFE]; The Economy, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/figures/economy_en [https://perma.cc/FWR9-B934].
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choices for Amazon: (1) continue on the path of monopolizing and take
the risk of incurring fines from the EC or (2) learn from its predecessors’
past mistakes and avoid them by modifying its site, contracts, and strategies
to comply with the EC’s parameters, thereby losing market share and billions 
of dollars in revenue in the process.  Neither are ideal situations, but both 
are the realities of being an American based monopoly in a time where 
the U.S. is not the most loved country in the world, especially by Europe.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The unfair treatment towards “do no evil” monopoly-like corporations 
in the EU must end immediately.  Companies should not be shying away
from their well-deserved success, nor should they be limiting their entrance 
into the world’s second largest economic market (which generated $19.2 
trillion in 2016)235 because they are fearful of the Commission imposing 
fines.  Because of the EU’s antitrust regulatory scheme, there is substantial 
legal pressure to avoid conflict. This reluctance may negatively influence 
American companies’ business strategies, decisions, and implementation 
in the EEA, ultimately hurting the corporation’s overall performance.  No 
corporation should be intimidated to enter a market because they are fearful 
they will be punished for capturing the market successfully. 
It seems clear in the cases of Google and Microsoft that the companies 
were punished due to their success and reprimanded for employing tactics 
that promote and favor themselves.  From a business perspective, if 
a corporation is not strategizing and “scheming” to find ways to earn more 
revenue, be more successful, and capture a greater share of the market, it 
is not a “good” company.  Investors, shareholders, business analysts, and 
consumers could criticize the company for not pursuing greater market
shares or earning more revenue, and shareholders could even bring derivative 
suits against the corporation if the directors and managers are not acting
in the best interest of the corporation.  From a shareholder perspective, it 
is the primary goal of a corporation to make money, and most hope to
generate more money each year, if not every quarter.236  To earn more revenue,
companies need to expand, which realistically is at the expense of other 
companies. 
235. See supra text accompanying note 234. 
236. Steve Denning, Is the Goal of a Corporation to Make Money?, FORBES (Sept.
26, 2011 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/09/26/is-the-goal-
of-a-corporation-to-make-money/#4e34573f54ed [https://perma.cc/G6XF-GEAX].
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Capitalism is an economic system and ideology based on private ownership 
of the means of production and the operation for profit.237  This lack of
control by the state means that there will be unbalance, inconsistency, and 
disproportionate prosperity by private actors, which is the basis of a laissez- 
faire system.238 Harshly put, the unsuccessful will fail and it is not the EU’s
responsibility to protect and preserve those that are unable to compete.  
On a simple level, it’s Darwinism.  Those that do not fight to survive and 
adapt to changing circumstances, go extinct.  If a company does not adapt, 
grow, and implement strategies and procedures that benefit themselves, 
they will sunset (a business term for decline).  We need to let nature takes 
its course.  Any business owner knows there is substantial risk when starting 
a business venture, especially when entering an established market where 
tech giants roam. 
To prevent the mistreatment of American corporations in the future, the 
EC should employ less strict requirements for an Article 102 “abuse of 
market dominance” violation.  Companies should not be penalized for merely
holding substantial market share and implementing competitive sales or 
guaranteed outcome strategies that make competition fierce but not exclusive.
Owning and controlling substantial market share means that a company 
has successfully captured the market and created customer and brand loyalty. 
The product or service is then in high-demand and the company has most 
likely found the best marketing or delivery strategies to reach the most
people. This could be interpreted as favoritism by consumers.  Mere favoritism 
should not be considered an abuse of power under Article 102.
In addition to loosening the requirements of what is deemed an “abuse 
of market dominance,” the EC should also provide explicitly detailed examples 
of what “abuse of market dominance” is so American corporations can tailor 
their products or services to comply with international rules.  Examples could
include: (1) providing conditional payments to retailers, manufacturers, or 
producers for exclusivity of sale in a geographic area; (2) disproportionately 
de-prioritizing competitors on your platform or favoring your products or 
services on a generic platform; or (3) owning x% of market share and
implementing enumerated strategies which are harmful to competitors.
This may be particularly helpful for internet-based companies such as
Amazon and Google who can easily code their platforms to limit features 
of their site based on the IP address of the user, similar to how certain Netflix
237. Kimberly Amadeo, Capitalism, Its Characteristics, With Pros and Cons: How 
It Works Compared to Socialism and Communism, BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/ 
capitalism-characteristics-examples-pros-cons-3305588 [https://perma.cc/HGR8-KAAR].
238. Arthur Foulkes, Capitalism and Democracy, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Nov. 1, 
2006), https://fee.org/articles/capitalism-and-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/B66Y-3B6F].
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shows are available based on the country of access.239  For example, in the
EEA, Google could tailor its Google Shopping feature such that competitors 
are given equal opportunity to be listed on the first page while in America, 
companies can continue to purchase their “spot” and Google can self-promote 
its own services.  It is true abuses of market dominance, such as price fixing 
or unreasonable vertical or horizontal integration, that should be fined, not 
the reasonable practices of a successful corporation. 
These solutions may not be feasible if the EU truly has a bias against
American corporations.  If the EU’s intentions are to protect European-
based companies from American giants, then the above suggestions are futile. 
Even if the EU creates detailed guidelines, procedures, and examples of what 
companies shouldn’t do, companies may still be found liable and imposed
fines for their practices simply because it looks like they are abusing their
dominant power and hurting European-based companies. It is true that “abuse
of market dominance” is not easily definable, can translate to innumerable
different types of violations, and requires a complete investigation of the
totality of the circumstances.  It may not even be possible to draft a precise
definition and create guidelines regarding antitrust.  Furthermore, from a 
policy perceptive, the EU probably does not want to create a bright-line rule 
to ensure that the law is broad enough to encompass violations and practices
that will evolve in the future.  If the law is too narrow, it may be effective,
but not fully encompassing.  Regardless, as the law currently stands in the
EU, it is penalizing companies who truly are doing no evil.
This is not to say that there are not American companies who are illegally 
abusing their status, power, or employing strategies that violate antitrust
law. However, empirically speaking, the companies the EU has chosen
to punish are merely innocent companies that are being punished because 
they are successful compared to their European and international counterparts. 
Lastly, American companies who are enjoying fruitful success and
becoming moguls in their field should tread lightly when entering and 
operating in the EEA.  Once a company is on the EC’s radar, it is difficult to
leave, hence why so many investigations have been launched into the same 
companies.  American companies should especially take extra precaution 
during the remaining years of Trump’s presidency.  It is important to consider 
the President’s influence on international markets, based on his policies and 





















    
 








actions in the White House, and how much influence the U.S.’s international 
reputation has on international treatment of American corporations when
making business decisions or designing corporate strategies.  It is inevitable
that as Trump’s reputation appreciates or depreciates, the EU’s treatment
of American corporations will vary.  No matter how much international
consumers love a company, there is no immunity from international
governments. 
V. CONCLUSION
If Europe continues these anti-competition practices against American
corporations, Europe will start to become a no-go zone for corporate America.240 
These practices go far beyond penalties for monopoly-like practices but
also demands for “unpaid taxes” from companies like Apple, McDonalds, 
and Amazon that have reached tax deals with member countries.241  At the
end of the day, it will be Europe’s consumers that suffer if American companies 
begin to avoid European markets.242  The companies the EC has targeted 
in the past, Microsoft, Intel and Google, are some of the most prestigious 
innovators of the world, and without them, Europe’s businesses will wither 
and its consumers will suffer the consequences of a lacking market.243  The
EU’s practices could even be characterized as a systematic discrimination 
against American corporations and in the end could result in Google and 
other American corporations beginning to de-prioritize the European market 
and eventually withdrawing from the EEA altogether to avoid abuse.244 
There is no question that Europe has failed to compete with or produce
innovation in the internet and technology industry245 and that American 
corporations are leading the way for the new universe that is the World 
Wide Web.  If the EU continues to punish these corporations for their success, 
European markets will no doubt be left behind. 
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241. Id.
 242. Id.
 243. Id.
 244. Id.
 245. Id.
398
